More … than 677,000 Ukrainians have already fled Russia’s war against their country since Tuesday, and this number is increasing hour by hour.

“Rarely have I seen such an incredibly rapid exodus of people – the largest in Europe since the Balkan wars,” UN Refugee Commissioner Filippo Grandi told a Security Council meeting on Monday. United Nations.

European governments and aid organizations have been planning for their arrival for weeks, but the number of refugees has exceeded those expectations. The UN predicted that 4 million Ukrainian refugees could arrive in neighboring countries in the coming weeks.

Such a large influx would be a “huge burden on receiving states and would undoubtedly strain reception systems and related resources”, Grandi said.

So far, at least 280,000 Ukrainians have gone to Poland, 94,000 to Hungary, 40,000 to Moldova, 34,000 to Romania, 30,000 to Slovakia and tens of thousands to other European countries. A “significant number” also went to Russia, according to Grandi. Most of the refugees are women and children, including a growing number of unaccompanied children. Ukraine has drafted men between the ages of 18 and 60 to fight, banning them from leaving.

Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images

Refugees arrive by crowded trains, by car and even on foot after traveling tens of kilometres, queuing at borders for safety and bringing whatever they could fit in their suitcases if they had time to pack. . Those who can afford it have found their own accommodation, but others are staying in government-run shelters, hotels paid for by private companies, churches, or with their families or ordinary citizens who have offered to host them. .

Currently, with the help of the international community, Ukraine’s neighbors are managing to manage the refugees they host. But for them to continue to do so successfully, they will need a lot more supplies and money, and quickly.

There are still long queues at the borders

Neighboring countries have kept their borders open, unlike other migration crises in the recent past. But crossing the border remains an arduous process.

Although Poland accepts refugees without passports, there were mile-long queues at border crossings where people had to wait up to 60 hours to be processed in freezing temperatures and slept in their cars, if at all. The traffic got so bad that the Polish government asked volunteers not to show up at the border unless they had made arrangements to meet the refugees in advance.

There is also a 20-hour queue in Romania, and it takes 24 hours to travel the roughly 60 kilometers from Odessa to Ukraine’s border with Moldova, according to the UN.

There have been reports black refugees, many of whom are third-country nationals who were students in Ukraine, face difficulties crossing. At the Polish border, Ukrainian guards sent blacks to back of the line last week, claiming that “Ukrainians” had priority. Polish authorities said anyone arriving at the border was allowed to cross.

“We strongly condemn this racism and believe that it undermines the spirit of solidarity that is so urgently needed today,” Kenya’s UN Ambassador Martin Kimani said at the Council meeting on Monday. security.

Ensuring that refugees in line have adequate access to food, water and medical support is also an issue. A Nepali man studying in Ukraine said he hadn’t eaten for three days while waiting to enter Poland, and another elderly woman died at one of the border checkpoints, according to The Washington Post.

NGOs tried to help. Chef Jose Andres’ World Central Kitchen, for example, delivered 4,000 meals in 18 hours at Medyka, currently Poland’s busiest border crossing. Polish authorities have also tried to streamline processing, but resources and staff at their borders are simply not equipped to handle the current volume of arrivals.

Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images

European countries ensure Ukrainians have a place to go

The European community has mobilized to guarantee Ukrainians short- and long-term housing. Local governments have created temporary shelters and civilians are hosting refugees in their homes. The EU has also asked the 27 member countries to grant asylum to all Ukrainians for up to three years, which would give them access to social services and permission to work. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson said on Sunday that an “overwhelming majority” supported the measure, but did not specify which countries opposed it.

In Poland, where at least 40% of Ukrainian refugees have gone so far, new arrivals are transported via tourist buses to one of nine reception centres, where they receive meals, medical care, beds and legal information and services. In the town of Korczowa, for example, a makeshift shelter with folding beds was set up inside a deposit. There, they can also meet as a family; Poland was already home to around 2 million Ukrainians before the latest Russian incursion.

Polish civilians also demanded their support for the refugees. Residents of Warsaw, the Polish capital, have announced around 2,500 apartments where refugees can stay. They also flocked to reception centers offering to transport or house refugees and bringing donations of food, water, clothing, sleeping bags, shoes, blankets, diapers, toys, sanitary products, batteries and charging cables for mobile phones.

Private companies have also funded housing for Ukrainians. Airbnb, for example, has offered free short-term accommodation to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees and is working with countries in the region to organize long-term stays. There is also an online directory of hotels and hostels that have openings for refugees.

The government, citizens and private businesses will need to continue to build capacity to prepare for even more arrivals, but other EU states have promised to share the responsibility by also welcoming refugees.

Ukrainian refugee population needs more humanitarian support in coming weeks

The needs of the Ukrainian refugee population in Europe are likely to only skyrocket in the coming weeks, and meeting those needs will require money.

Omar Marques/Getty Images

The UN, which has set up a Ukrainian Humanitarian Fund, requested a preliminary amount of $550.6 million from member states in addition to the $190 million it had already requested to help support reception efforts in neighboring countries. Humanitarian groups are still assessing the most urgent gaps in assistance, but this money will go towards shelter, emergency relief items, cash assistance, and mental health and psychosocial support for people. refugees.

For its part, the United States recently approved $54 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine, and Congress plans to release an additional $2.9 billion. However, every day lawmakers deliberate delays the delivery of aid.

The European Commission also said its pledge of 90 million euros in aid on February 28 was just the start.

“Until there, [the needs of Ukrainian refugees] have been met, although I am seriously concerned about the likely further escalation in arrivals,” Grandi said on Monday.

While Russia is likely to move closer to China to make up for the loss of goods and services it would normally get from the West, Smith said, “they are also betting that their huge energy supplies will continue to be in demand, “especially in this cold winter. There’s a lot more profit to be had from their energy if they can get it to market.”

Last month, Russia and China signed a 30-year agreement that will allow Russia to supply gas to China, although the pipelines to transport that gas will not be completed for at least three years. In addition, China announced last week that it would allow wheat imports from all regions of Russia for the first time.

However, Smith said the Chinese and others would “do incredibly difficult business” now that Russia has fewer willing buyers, and China will want to avoid being subjected to secondary sanctions or enforcement. sanctions violations.

On Monday, the United States further tightened its sanctions to immobilize all assets of the Russian Central Bank in the United States or held by Americans. The Biden administration estimated the move could impact hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian funding.

The latest measures included an exclusion that allows energy-related transactions with the bank. Sanctions also have no impact on Russia’s stockpile of gold, which Putin has been accumulating for several years.

Tyler Kustra, an assistant professor of politics at the University of Nottingham who has studied economic sanctions, said Moscow had already adopted a “Russian fortress economy” – producing many goods domestically even though it was easier to import them – to protect the economy from sanctions.

Much of Russian food is produced locally, but some of it does not match similar products made abroad, while others cannot be replaced, he said.

“My friends in Moscow say, ‘Listen, they’ve never really been able to make cheese,'” Kustra said.

Increased reliance on cryptocurrency will be an inevitable way for Russia to try to support its financial transactions, said David Szakonyi, professor of political science at George Washington University, “but it is unlikely to serve substitute for business transactions over time.

While roughly 80% of Russia’s financial transactions in the past have been conducted with the dollar, federal and treasury law enforcement officials are stepping up efforts to “aggressively combat” the misuse of the dollar. cryptocurrency to evade sanctions, according to a White House official who was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

The official would not comment on whether the Biden administration plans to target Russian-based crypto exchanges for sanctions.

The administration has experience in regulating Russian crypto activities. Earlier this year, the Treasury sanctioned Russia-based SUEX and 25 affiliated cryptocurrency firms, blacklisting the exchange from the dollar financial system, for allegedly helping hackers clean up and cash out their booty. It was the first crypto firm to receive this designation.

Ari Redbord, a former senior treasury adviser who leads government affairs at TRM, which among other things develops financial crime analytics, said his organization had identified at least 340 companies in Russia that could potentially be used as “crawling ramps.” access and egress” for cryptography. currency.

Redbord said that due to the scale of the sanctions, the amount of crypto Russia would need to replace the billions in sanctions “would be very difficult to turn into traditional currency.”

Ori Lev, who served as an enforcement officer at the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control during the Obama administration, said that overall, “whether it’s using cryptocurrency or rely on China, there are mitigating measures they can take, but they cannot recreate the financial system.”

The Biden administration has argued that China will not be able to make up for the loss of US and European businesses and that sanctions cutting off Russia from Western sovereign debt markets will be crippling. At the same time, the White House has sought to make a public case that Beijing coming to the aid of Moscow could damage China’s reputation in Europe and around the world in the long term.

On Monday afternoon, the ruble had cratered and Russians queued for hours at ATMs as inflation fears exploded.

“I don’t know what specific steps they’re going to take to ease the bite of the sanctions, but that’s not going to undo them,” Lev said.

___

Associated Press writers Aamer Madhani, Alan Suderman in Richmond, Virginia and Kelvin Chan in London contributed to this report.

“The United States and the EU are working together toward a continuous, sufficient, and timely supply of natural gas to the EU from diverse sources around the world to avoid supply shocks, including those that could result from a new Russian invasion of Ukraine,” President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in a joint statement on Friday.

Rising tensions around a build-up of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border have again shone the spotlight on the controversial Nord Stream 2 project, a gas pipeline stretching over 1,200 kilometers from western Russia to the north -eastern Germany under the Baltic Sea, which was completed at the end of 2021.

If the pipeline – a joint project involving a consortium of Russian, German, Dutch and French energy companies – receives the green light from Brussels to become operational, it will be able to pump 55 billion cubic meters of gas to Germany each year.

But the current diplomatic crisis with Russia complicates the pipeline’s future. If Russia invades Ukraine, “the decision to stop Nord Stream 2 would be part of the EU’s political or military strategy,” said Anna Creti, director of the climate economics department at Paris Dauphine University. , in an interview with FRANCE 24. “But it cannot be done unilaterally; it would require the agreement of the entire consortium.

In the long-term contract for Nord Stream 2, “on one side we have the Russian national company Gazprom, and on the other we have several European companies that have to negotiate, obtain or modify clauses,” Creti said. “The EU is not a single stakeholder and Russia can negotiate with [respective] companies – and maybe play against each other.”

Signal that supplies are at risk

On the other hand, “if Russia decides to stop the flow of gas to Europe, it would not be overnight,” Creti said, adding that a complete disruption of energy supply would be unlikely. given the safety risks of a sudden stoppage of gas flows.

A more likely scenario would be for Russia to further decrease gas flow over a few weeks, sending a very clear signal to Europeans that their supply is in jeopardy, according to Creti.

Something similar happened in 2008, when a disagreement between Moscow and Kyiv over energy payments and accusations that Ukraine was siphoning gas prompted Moscow to shut down energy flows, leaving some parts of Europe without Russian energy for more than two weeks in January.

According to Eurostat, more than half of the EU’s energy needs – 61% – were met by imports in 2019. The EU depends mainly on Russia for imports of crude oil, natural gas (35% of l EU supply) and solid fuels, followed by Norway.

If Europe were to wean itself off Russian gas, what would be the alternatives? “This is where the role of the United States as a gas exporter comes into play,” Creti said.

The United States is a major producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be transported by sea to regasification terminals. LNG is a practical alternative to conventional gas, an energy source that can only be transported by pipeline. US authorities announced on Tuesday that they were in negotiations with suppliers in the Middle East and North Africa to increase LNG deliveries to Europe.

“LNG diversions can also come from southern Europe and Asia, although these are last-minute supplies bought at a high price,” Creti noted.

As part of its pressure campaign against the Ukrainian government, Russia has cut the amount of energy supplies flowing through Ukraine to Europe by about 50 percent, The New York Times reported.

The future of the Nord Stream 2 will remain uncertain as long as the verbal contests between Moscow and the West continue.

The pipeline must pass two other hurdles before becoming fully operational: safety certification and regulatory approval. The Brussels authorities are currently deciding whether the gas pipeline complies with European energy regulations. While the decision may seem purely technical, ultimately “the Commission will have to decide whether it is going to give Russia too much power,” Creti said.

A senior German diplomat, interviewed by FRANCE 24, played down the potential dangers, noting that Russia also relies on Europe.

“Of course there is a certain interdependence – we get a lot of gas from Russia, and the EU is the biggest gas market for Russia. A large part of Russian income comes from gas exports. As far as gas is concerned, there is currently a security of supply,” said the diplomat, who requested anonymity.

Germany has been accused in recent weeks of wavering in its response to Russia’s aggressive stance, breaking ranks with its EU partners by excluding arms exports to Kiev and saying that Nord Stream 2 should be considered separately from the question of Ukraine since it is a “private sector”. project”.

For the German diplomat, Berlin’s position is unequivocal. “We have been very clear that Russian threats are unacceptable and we have fully aligned with our NATO and EU partners. There was no hesitation.”

In Germany’s new coalition government, the Green Party has been a strong advocate for a hardline approach to Russia. Annalena Baerbock, the new foreign minister and member of the Green party, recently signaled her willingness to stand up to Putin, saying Nord Stream 2 should be included in the arsenal of sanctions being prepared against Russia.

After talks with officials in Kyiv, Baerbock arrived in Moscow on January 18 for a high-stakes meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

At the joint press conference following the talks with Lavrov, Baerbock stood his ground, warning that if Russia invaded Ukraine, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline would not move forward. Hours later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaffirmed that position, saying Germany would consider stopping Nord Stream 2 operations if Russia attacked Ukraine.

While the pipeline is currently on hold, the Kremlin announced last Friday that Putin was to meet with German business leaders.

Asked to speculate on the content of the talks, Creti offered: “The Russians could say ‘We have to stop wasting time’ and threaten European companies with sanctions” if the pipeline does not become operational, she said. the

The Europeans could also seek to level the playing field in the gas wars, turning the Nord Stream tap on or off again depending on the current state of Russia’s relations with Europe.

At the moment, she said, “there’s a 50/50 chance” of continued cooperation on the pipeline.

This should be a good time to rethink the EU’s maligned fiscal rules. Many things have changed in recent years. Above all, the desire for public and private investment – ​​to accelerate the decarbonisation of the economy as well as its digitalisation – is widespread, both in Brussels and in the national capitals.

The pandemic has also overhauled the old policy. The Rubicon of common borrowing for cross-border transfers has been crossed. The clear success of massive deficit spending in 2020 has reinforced the lesson that European policymakers began to reluctantly learn after previous crises: that a rigid approach to fiscal discipline hurts rather than helps fiscal sustainability. , economic growth and political cohesion.

A changing of the guard in important countries creates an opportunity to look at old issues with new eyes. The new government in Berlin seems committed to investment-intensive growth, both at home and in Europe. A similar opening can be detected in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Mario Draghi’s tenure as Prime Minister in Italy has reduced North-South mistrust. The same applies to the implementation of the jointly funded national recovery plans, widely considered (so far) to be a success, except for countries determined to undermine the EU legal order.

But no one would bet on a political deal being struck to overhaul fiscal rules, which are set to be reintroduced next year, after being relaxed at the start of the pandemic.

So we live with a double paradox. EU countries are collectively pursuing far better economic policies than they have for a long time. This is true in the short term – the effects of the pandemic on jobs, incomes and productivity have been far more minor and short-lived than we had reason to fear – and in their long-term ambitions. Yet, on both fronts, this progress would be held back by the current fiscal framework, in particular its drastic requirement to reduce the public debt burden.

Finance ministers are acutely aware of the risk of undermining the recovery by phasing out fiscal support too early – indeed, they have jointly recommended a “moderately supportive fiscal stance” for the euro area as a whole this year. And the commitment to invest in the green and digital transition, while ensuring it does not leave people behind, is strong. Yet the rules cannot simply be ignored in a union that is more a body of law than anything else.

There are three ways out of this dilemma. One is to subject economic policy to the old rules, assuming that the legal ties that underpin the European project must take priority. But the previous crisis showed that if you try that, you sacrifice both economic performance and political cohesion.

The next is to extend the rules enough to allow the desired policies. As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz likes to point out, the budgetary framework has proven its flexibility. His suspension could be extended. The European Commission has great power of interpretation and could issue more lenient guidance on how Brussels will judge whether national policies comply with the rules, rewarding growth-enhancing investment with fewer restriction requirements.

This carries its own risks. National governments find it convenient to relinquish any responsibility for EU-wide policy coordination; opposition parties would accuse them of caving in to Brussels. The finger pointing that divides other member states, which the pandemic has somewhat tamed, could easily escalate again. Something like this is, however, the most likely outcome if governments cannot agree on the third option: changing the rules altogether.

The reason this is so difficult is that there has been little clear thinking about what the rules are meant to accomplish. Traditional economic arguments seem outdated: the inflationary fallout from overspending has proven less risky than beggar-thy-neighbour austerity; the pressures on the interest rates of national borrowings are non-existent; and there are now bailout funds to deal with refinancing crises.

Likewise, current rules do little to address today’s greatest economic challenges, which, like it or not, call for more militant state policy and arguably more borrowing. public only when the rules were first developed. The best prospect for reform is for leaders to first agree on the rationale for the rules and derive new ones from an understanding of the economic policies that would achieve the broader sense of sustainability to which they are now engaged.

The proposal from France and Italy to promote certain types of investment has the merit of doing so. It is incumbent on those who oppose it to do the same.

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On September 16, 2021, China applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This immediately sparked a debate among trade watchers over the merits, as well as the benefits and risks, of China’s joining the trade pact. Moreover, the context included the irony that China might join the CPTPP before the pact’s chief architect, the United States.

The United States originally designed the CPTPP’s predecessor, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as a regional counterweight to Chinese state capitalism. The objective was to design an agreement with a significant economic weight – nearly 40% of world GDP with the United States included – and a transregional geographical distribution. More importantly, the deal would lock in a liberal trading system in the Indo-Pacific.

However, with the rise of Donald Trump, this goal almost disappeared, having withdrawn the United States from the negotiations in 2018. While the remaining members, led by Japan, finally saved the agreement, renamed CPTTP, its final economic size has shrunk considerably, representing only 14% of global GDP.

More importantly, in the absence of Washington, the CPTPP lacks a sufficiently large liberal market economy anchor that can hold firm against any future Chinese membership. Trade negotiations are highly strategic situations in which nations seek to gain comparative advantages by shaping the rules of the game in a way that best suits their economy. Thus, a Chinese membership would likely lead to attempts to relax the rules or obtain exemptions for Beijing’s economic model and preferences.

It is not a foregone conclusion that China would obtain significant changes and/or exemptions to CPTPP rules from existing members during such accession. Nevertheless, the stark reality is that China’s nominal GDP is significantly higher than the combined GDP of the current 11 CPTPP members. Moreover, its economy is at the center of regional value chains and trade flows, which would guarantee Beijing strong leverage to negotiate favorable terms for its state-capitalist trade model in accession negotiations.

If the CPTPP’s promise to secure 21st century liberal rules is under threat, what can be done about it?

In our recent policy brief from the Lowy Institute, we argue that the European Union should throw its hat into the CPTPP membership circle. While acknowledging the many hurdles such a proposal faces, the goal of our analysis is to uncover the compelling strategic rationale for making the improbable possible.

In favor of EU membership are the following.

First, after labeling China a “systemic rival” in 2019, the European Commission increasingly recognizes that competition with China is about fundamental differences in business models, and therefore a key aspect of the challenge concerns the rules of competition. economic interaction.

Second, the European Union is the only global player with the trade preferences and economic clout to provide a similar anchor function for market-driven trade as was envisaged for the United States in the CPTPP.

Third, the European Union has adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy, recognizing that the region is now a “region of primary strategic importance for the interests of the EU”. One such interest is the maintenance of a liberal rules-based trading order. Joining the CPTPP would offer Brussels a tangible link between its Indo-Pacific strategy and its commercial diplomacy – the area where the EU’s institutional agency is strongest.

These are compelling strategic reasons that we believe should be taken seriously in Brussels and in European capitals. However, the arguments in favor of membership are not so clear cut. The CPTPP raises difficulties for the European Union which will offer political indigestion at the mere thought of membership. We highlight two; no doubt others are noticeable.

First, the rules of the agreement were designed primarily by the United States. The European Union sees itself as a trade leader and prefers to be on the ground floor of any new trade negotiations, rather than a late entrant accepting other people’s rules.

Second, the CPTPP’s rules on digital commerce are in line with US preferences, so the “use” of data takes priority over the “protection” of data. This goes against the EU’s view that data protection is a human right, with the high levels of privacy and protection in its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) being a consequence. of this approach.

These obstacles should not be underestimated. That said, we argue that in an increasingly contested geo-economic world, the long-term strategic, political and economic gains of securing a liberal rules-based trading system should shift EU thinking in favor of membership.

For Canberra, which regularly expresses a commitment to developing international rules in line with its standards and values, promoting EU membership of the CPTPP would contribute to this objective. It would also greatly strengthen ties with a strategic and like-minded partner in a time of post-AUKUS tension.

The big picture should also be kept at the forefront when thinking about joining the CPTPP. The “globalisation” hope of systemic convergence has been dashed. Instead, a condition of “systemic rivalry” exists, in which the largest and most important economies now represent two fundamentally different ways of institutionalizing a market economy, namely liberal-capitalist on the one hand and state -socialist on the other.

Competing economic systems are a vehicle for contesting the fundamental rules of economic interaction. In many cases, trade-offs will require one party to consider giving up core values ​​of political-economic governance. In reality, these values ​​will almost certainly be non-negotiable. In the world of systemic rivalry, trade agreements pose a deeper strategic question about which rules will prevail. The CPTPP offers the European Union a crucial opportunity to establish rules which it considers essential both for the national interest of its members and for the maintenance of the values ​​of the Union.

WASHINGTON — Isar Aerospace has won 10 million euros ($11.3 million) in a European Union prize competition, the latest sign of the EU’s growing role in supporting Europe’s launch industry .

At the 14th European Space Conference in Brussels on January 25, Thierry Breton, the European Commissioner whose portfolio includes space, announced that Munich-based company Isar Aerospace had won the European Council’s Horizon Prize. innovation for its low-cost space launch. Isar is developing a small launcher called Spectrum with first launch scheduled for late 2022 at the earliest.

Isar was one of three finalists for the award announced earlier this month by the European Commission, along with another German developer of small launchers, Rocket Factory Augsburg, and Spanish company Payload Aerospace, which is working on a small reusable launcher. Those three came from an initial pool or more than 15 applicants, Breton said during a ceremony at the conference to announce the winner.

“It’s a big, big deal for us because it shows, first of all, the maturity on our side,” Stella Guillen, chief commercial officer of Isar, said in an interview. “It shows that we are carrying out these microlauncher activities in Europe. It is also a huge sign of confidence on the part of the European Commission. It lends credibility to what we do.

The Isar had already raised more than 150 million euros to fund the development of Spectrum, a vehicle designed to place up to 1,000 kilograms into low Earth orbit. The company expanded a factory to produce the rocket and set up an engine test site in Sweden.

She said the company would use the prize money to support the company’s research and development activities and infrastructure. Testing of the engines that will power Spectrum, as well as other vehicle components, is underway. This work keeps the company on schedule for a first launch from Andøya, Norway, late this year or early next year.

While Isar seeks spectrum customers worldwide, it is focused on both European government and commercial customers. “There’s a huge need for a flexible launcher that can launch multiple times, either carpool or dedicated,” Guillen said. “I think our advantage for launching outside of Europe is the European market in general.”

An increasing EU role in the launch

The European Commission has supported the efforts of small launchers like Isar despite skepticism from some players in the European space industry and some national governments about the size of the market for such vehicles.

“Small launcher solutions can offer flexibility, responsiveness and affordability,” Breton said at the awards ceremony. He predicted that the institutional demand for small launchers in Europe will increase.

“The European launcher industry, especially for micro and mini-launchers, is very promising,” he said. “We need to make sure we have microlauncher solutions in the EU”

The award to Isar Aerospace is just the latest sign of the European Commission’s growing interest in launcher development, a role traditionally left to national governments and the European Space Agency.

During a panel discussion at the January 25 conference, Paraskevi Papantoniou, Deputy Director for Space in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence, Industry and Space, said that the commission was looking at other ways to support the industry, such as improving access to testing facilities. “We realize there are bottlenecks, so that’s something we’re looking at closely,” she said.

She said the commission had budgeted 65 million euros for space access programs in 2021 and 2022, mainly to support the development of propulsion technologies and reusability. His office is preparing a work plan for 2023 and 2024 which may require additional funding. “We want to strengthen our support a little bit around the commission’s strategic priorities,” she said, including space transportation technology and ground infrastructure.

One proposal that has received intense scrutiny is the creation of a European “launcher alliance” that would bring together established and emerging launch providers. Breton, in a speech that opened the conference, said that a formal announcement of a European Space Launcher Alliance would come soon “to define a technological roadmap and a comprehensive European approach to launchers” to support large and small vehicles.

“It’s not about creating a monopoly. It’s not about favoring certain existing players,” Papantoniou said of the alliance. Instead, she described the alliance as bringing together existing and new launch companies, as well as the public sector, “to discuss what the European vision for the future of launch should be.”

The alliance, she said, would work in cooperation with the companies and with ESA on developing a long-term roadmap for launch vehicle development. It would also meet the demand for new launchers from the public and private sectors.

The companies on the panel had mixed reactions to the alliance. “We understand how important it is for Europe to gain and maintain its leadership,” said Morena Bernardini, Vice President of Strategy at ArianeGroup. “That’s only possible if the industry pushes in one direction.”

“We’ll see what comes out of it,” said Jörn Spurmann, commercial director of Rocket Factory Augsburg. “I hope this will facilitate what we are looking for, which is a free commercial market for the institutional payloads that we have in Europe.”

Daniel Metzler, managing director of Isar Aerospace, was more skeptical. “A lot depends on how it is actually implemented. In Europe, we are extremely good at bureaucracy, unfortunately,” he said. Having an “open platform” for launch services with the European Commission as the main customer would be a good thing. But, he warned, “if we make mistakes in the processes and in the way we implement them, it could backfire.”

“We really want to be there as an honest broker,” Papantoniou said of the alliance, facilitating both small and big players. “We can be very bureaucratic in Brussels, so that’s something we have to fight against.”

A number of Spain’s CEOs have expressed concern over the fair and appropriate management of EU financial resources to help mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the country’s struggling economy, the report said. Spanish media.

According to data revealed by the 25th Global CEO Survey, published by PwC on Tuesday, 31% of Spanish CEOs fear that short-term projects will be favored over long-term results, financial daily Cinco Días reported.

Some 27% are worried about the lack of clarity of projects eligible for European economic support, while 22% are worried about the excessive bureaucracy of Spanish public administrations to manage the resources.

But, although the COVID-19 pandemic is weighing heavily on the Spanish – and global – economy, business leaders seem optimistic for the near future, the text of the PwC survey bed.

According to the report, 85% of Spanish CEOs expect the economy to be in better shape in 2022 than last year, putting this PwC “trust barometer” for Spanish CEOs at the highest level. for a decade.

Internationally, 77% of the world’s top CEOs believe this year could see a clear trend of global recovery, while 15% believe the situation will get worse.

But despite the optimism reflected in this survey, it also presents some overall uncertainties and threats to the evolution of the global economy: cybersecurity and health risks are the most relevant, with responses of 49% and 48%, with the highly volatile macroeconomic environment in third place with 43%.

It looks like a full recovery in Spain will have to wait another year, at least until 2023, to return to pre-pandemic levels, according to several new forecasts. EFE had reported.

(Fernando Heller | EuroEFE.EURACTIV.es)

The Gymnich meetings are an opportunity for informal, open and strategic discussions on the priorities of the European Union’s foreign policy. Both the long-term outlook and the major current international crises are discussed.

As is tradition, the informal meeting of foreign ministers will directly follow a meeting of member states’ defense ministers. All ministers will participate in a joint working session.

The French Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have decided to focus the meeting in Brest on fundamental subjects to strengthen European sovereignty on the international scene:

Ministers will have an in-depth discussion on the strategic compass in a joint session with defense ministers from EU member states ahead of the meeting with Heads of State and Government in March. The Strategic Compass is a veritable “White Paper” defining the 2030 ambition of European defense. It enables Member States to define a common strategic vision for the European Union over the next decade. They have been working on it for over a year. The strategic compass will combine a European definition of threats, the strengthening of European operational and industrial capabilities and the defense of the European Union’s interests and freedom of action in contested areas such as the seas and oceans, space , cyberspace and information. It will define the actions to be undertaken in four key areas: crisis management, capacity building, resilience and partnerships. In Brest, the French presidency of the Council of the European Union wants to push the work towards an ambitious strategic compass to ensure a stronger and more operational European defense.

Ministers will discuss the security situation in the eastern neighborhood of the European Union, notably in Ukraine and Belarus. Following the latest meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, during which member states reiterated their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as their solidarity with Belarusian civil society, ministers will reassess the geostrategic environment. They will discuss the initiatives to be deployed in response to the immediate and long-term challenges for the region’s security.

Ministers will discuss EU-China relations, including China’s attitude towards certain EU Member States which are under strong political, economic and trade pressure. This will be an opportunity to ensure that the European Union’s multidimensional approach, developed in its 2019 Joint Communication, contributes to the objective of having a more balanced, stable and predictable relationship. Ministers will also discuss how China promotes its model within the multilateral system and how the European Union should react.

The French Presidency of the Council of the European Union will organize a joint working session ahead of the European Union-African Union Summit to be held on February 17 and 18, 2022. Moussa Faki Mahamat, President of the African Union Commission, and Aissata Tall Sall, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal, have been invited to this working session where ministers will discuss the future of African Union-European Union relations. This summit will also be an opportunity to overhaul the partnership between the two continents and to strengthen the strategic links between the European Union and the African Union in shared priorities such as prosperity, security and mobility alongside African partners. .

Ministers will be able to discuss any issue on the international agenda at the meeting in Brest. Relevant Commissioners and the Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs will be invited to participate in certain discussions.

More information on the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union